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Abstract—The recent proliferation of increasingly capable
mobile devices has given rise to mobile crowd sensing (MCS)
systems that outsource the collection of sensory data to a crowd
of participating workers that carry various mobile devices.
Aware of the paramount importance of effectively incentiviz-
ing participation in such systems, the research community has
proposed a wide variety of incentive mechanisms. However,
different from most of these existing mechanisms which assume
the existence of only one data requester, we consider MCS
systems with multiple data requesters, which are actually more
common in practice. Specifically, our incentive mechanism is
based on double auction, and is able to stimulate the participation
of both data requesters and workers. In real practice, the
incentive mechanism is typically not an isolated module, but
interacts with the data aggregation mechanism that aggregates
workers’ data. For this reason, we propose CENTURION, a
novel integrated framework for multi-requester MCS systems,
consisting of the aforementioned incentive and data aggregation
mechanism. CENTURION’s incentive mechanism satisfies truth-
fulness, individual rationality, computational efficiency, as well as
guaranteeing non-negative social welfare, and its data aggregation
mechanism generates highly accurate aggregated results. The
desirable properties of CENTURION are validated through both
theoretical analysis and extensive simulations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent years have witnessed the rise of mobile crowd sens-
ing (MCS), a newly-emerged sensing paradigm that outsources
the collection of sensory data to a crowd of participating users,
namely (crowd) workers, who usually carry increasingly ca-
pable mobile devices (e.g., smartphones, smartwatches, smart-
glasses) with a plethora of on-board sensors (e.g., gyroscope,
camera, GPS, compass, accelerometer). Currently, a large
variety of MCS systems [1–6] have been deployed that cover
almost every aspect of our lives, including healthcare, smart
transportation, environmental monitoring, and many others.
To perform the sensing tasks, the participating workers
typically consume their own resources such as computing and
communicating energy, and expose themselves to potential
privacy threats by sharing their personal data. For this reason, a
participant would not be interested in participating in the sens-
ing tasks, unless she receives a satisfying reward to compen-
sate her resource consumption and potential privacy breach.
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Therefore, it is necessary to design an effective incentive
mechanism that can achieve the maximum user participation.
Due to the paramount importance of stimulating participation,
many incentive mechanisms [7–31] have been proposed by the
research community. However, most of these aforementioned
past literature assume that there is only one data requester
who also serves as the platform in the MCS system. In
practice, however, there are usually multiple data requesters
competing for human resources, who usually outsource worker
recruiting to third-party platforms (e.g., Amazon Mechanical
Turk [32]) that have already gathered a large number of
workers. Therefore, in this paper, we focus on such MCS
systems where three parties, including the data requesters,
a platform (i.e., a cloud-based central server), as well as a
crowd of participating workers co-exist, and aim to develop a
new incentive mechanism that can decide which worker serves
which data requester at what price.
In real practice, the sensory data provided by individual
workers are usually quite unreliable due to various factors
(e.g., poor sensor quality, lack of sensor calibration, envi-
ronment noise). Hence, in order to cancel out the possible
errors from individual workers, it is highly necessary that the
platform utilizes a data aggregation mechanism to properly
aggregate their noisy and even conflicting data. In an MCS
system, the incentive and the data aggregation mechanism
are usually not isolated from each other. In fact, the data
aggregation mechanism typically interacts with the incentive
mechanism, and thus, affects its design and performance.
Intuitively, if the platform aggregates workers’ data in naive
ways (e.g., voting and average) that treat all workers’ data
equally, the incentive mechanism does not need to distinguish
them with respect to their reliability. However, a weighted
aggregation method that puts higher weights on more reli-
able workers is much more desirable, because it shifts the
aggregated results towards the data provided by the workers
with higher reliability. Accordingly, the incentive mechanism
should also incorporate workers’ reliability, and selects work-
ers that are more likely to provide reliable data.
Therefore, different from most of the aforementioned ex-
isting work [7–31], we propose CENTURION1, a novel in-
tegrated framework for multi-requester MCS systems, which
1The name CENTURION comes from inCENTivizing mUlti-Requester
mobIle crOwd seNsing.
consists of a weighted data aggregation mechanism that con-
siders workers’ diverse reliability in the calculation of the
aggregated results, together with an incentive mechanism that
selects workers who potentially will provide more reliable
data. Specifically, CENTURION’s incentive mechanism is
based on double auction [33], which involves auctions among
not only the workers, but also the data requesters, and is able
to incentivize the participation of both data requesters and
workers. This paper makes the following contributions.
• Different from existing work, we propose a novel integrated
framework for multi-requester MCS systems, called CEN-
TURION, consisting of a data aggregation and an incentive
mechanism. Such an integrated design, which captures the
interactive effects between the two mechanisms, is much
more complicated and challenging than designing them
separately.
• CENTURION’s double auction-based incentive mechanism
is able to incentivize the participation of both data requesters
and workers, and bears many desirable properties, including
truthfulness, individual rationality, computational efficiency,
as well as non-negative social welfare.
• The data aggregation mechanism of CENTURION takes
into consideration workers’ reliability, and calculates highly
accurate aggregated results.
In the rest of this paper, we first discuss the past literature
that are related to this work in Section II, and introduce
the preliminaries in Section III. Then, the design details of
CENTURION’s data aggregation and incentive mechanism are
described in Section IV. In Section V, we conduct extensive
simulations to validate the desirable properties of CENTU-
RION. Finally in Section VI, we conclude this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Aware of the paramount importance of attracting worker
participation, the research community has recently devel-
oped various incentive mechanisms [7–31] for MCS systems.
Among them, game-theoretic incentive mechanisms [7–28],
which utilize either auction [10–13, 18–28] or other game-
theoretic models [8, 9, 14–17], have gained increasing popu-
larity due to their ability to tackle workers’ selfish and strategic
behaviors. These mechanisms typically aim to maximize the
platform’s profit [14–23] or social welfare [9–13], and mini-
mize the platform’s payment [7, 8, 24–27] or social cost [28].
Different from most of the aforementioned past literature
which assume that there exists only one data requester, we
propose a novel incentive mechanism for MCS systems with
multiple data requesters that compete for human resources. In
fact, there do exist several prior work [19, 22, 28] designing in-
centive mechanisms for the multi-requester scenario. However,
they do not provide any joint design of the data aggregation
and the incentive mechanism as in this paper, which is
much more challenging than designing the two mechanisms
as isolated modules. Moreover, although similar integrated
designs that consider the two mechanisms are proposed in
some existing work [25, 26], as previously mentioned, they
assume that only one data requester exists in the MCS system.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we introduce the system overview, reliability
level model, auction model, as well as the design objectives.
A. System Overview
CENTURION is an MCS system framework consisting
of a cloud-based platform, a set of participating workers,
denoted as W = {w1, · · · , wN}, and a set of requesters,
denoted as R = {r1, · · · , rM}. Each requester rj ∈ R has
a sensing task τj to be executed by the workers. The set of
all requesters’ tasks is denoted as T = {τ1, · · · , τM}. We
are specifically interested in the scenario where T is a set of
M different binary classification tasks that require workers to
locally decide the classes of the events or objects, and report
to the platform their local decisions (i.e., the labels of the
observed events or objects). Such MCS systems, collecting
binary labels from the crowd, constitute a large portion of the
currently deployed MCS systems (e.g., congestion detection
systems that decide whether or not particular road segments
are congested [2], geotagging campaigns that tag whether
bumps or potholes exist on specific segments of road surface
[1, 3]).
Each task τj has a true label lj ∈ {−1,+1}, unknown to
the requesters, the platform, and the workers. If a worker wi
is chosen to execute task τj , she will provide to the platform
a label li,j . We define l = [li,j ] ∈ {−1,+1,⊥}N×M as the
matrix containing all workers’ labels, where li,j = ⊥ means
that task τj is not executed by worker wi. For every task τj , the
platform aggregates workers’ labels into an aggregated result,
denoted as l̂j , so as to cancel out the errors from individual
workers. The framework of CENTURION is given in Figure
1, and we describe its workflow as follows.
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Fig. 1. Framework of CENTURION (where circled numbers represent the
order of the events).
• Incentive Mechanism. Firstly, in the double auction-based
incentive mechanism, each requester rj submits to the
platform a sensing request containing the sensing task τj
to be executed (step 1 ), and a bid aj , the amount she is
willing to pay if the task is executed (step 2 ). Then, the
platform announces the set of sensing tasks T to the workers
(step 3 ). After receiving the task set, every worker wi sends
to the platform the set of tasks she wants to execute, denoted
as Γi ⊆ T , as well as a bid bi, which is her bidding price
for executing them (step 4 ). Based on received bids, the
platform determines the set of winning requesters SR, the
set of winning workers SW , as well as the payment prj
charged from every winning requester rj and the payment
pwi paid to every winning worker wi (step 5 ). Note that
losing requesters’ tasks are not executed, and thus, they do
not submit any payment. Similarly, losing workers do not
receive any payment, as they do not execute any task.
• Data Aggregation Mechanism. Next, the platform collects
the labels submitted by the winning workers (step 6 ),
calculates the aggregated results, and sends them to the
winning requesters (step 7 ).
• Finally, the platform charges prj from winning requester rj
(step 8 ), and pays pwi to winning worker wi (step 9 ).
We denote the requesters’ and workers’ bid profile as a =
(a1, · · · , aM ) and b = (b1, · · · , bN), respectively. Moreover,
the requesters’ and workers’ payment profile is denoted as
pr = (pr1, · · · , p
r
M ) and pw = (pw1 , · · · , pwN), respectively.
B. Reliability Level Model
Before worker wi executes task τj , her label about this task
can be regarded as a random variable Li,j . Then, we define
the reliability level of a worker in Definition 1.
Definition 1 (Reliability Level). A worker wi’s reliability level
θi,j about task τj is defined as the probability that she provides
a correct label about this task, i.e.,
θi,j = Pr[Li,j = lj ] ∈ [0, 1]. (1)
Moreover, we denote the workers’ reliability level matrix as
θ = [θi,j ] ∈ [0, 1]N×M .
We assume that the platform knows the reliability level
matrix θ a priori, and maintains a historical record of it.
In practice, the platform could obtain θ through various
approaches. For example, as, in many scenarios, workers tend
to have similar reliability levels for similar tasks, the platform
could assign to workers some tasks with known labels, and use
workers’ labels about these tasks to estimate their reliability
levels for similar tasks as in [34]. In cases where ground truth
labels are not available, θ can still be effectively inferred from
workers’ characteristics (e.g., the prices of a worker’s sensors,
a worker’s experience and reputation for similar tasks) using
the algorithms proposed in [35], or estimated using the labels
previously submitted by workers about similar tasks by the
methods in [36, 37].
C. Auction Model
In this paper, we consider the scenario where both requesters
and workers are strategic and selfish that aim to maximize their
own utilities. Since CENTURION involves auctions among
not only the workers, but also the requesters, we utilize the
following double auction for Multi-rEquester mobiLe crOwd
seNsing (MELON double auction), formally defined in Defi-
nition 2, as the incentive mechanism.
Definition 2 (MELON Double Auction). In a double auction
for multi-requester mobile crowd sensing (MELON double
auction), each requester rj obtains a value vj , if her task
τj is executed, and bids to the platform aj , the amount she
is willing to pay for the execution of her task. Each worker
wi is interested in executing one subset of the tasks, denoted
as Γi ⊆ T , and bids to the platform bi, her bidding price for
executing these tasks. Her actual sensing cost for executing
all tasks in Γi is denoted as ci. Both the requesters’ values
and workers’ costs are unknown to the platform.
Then, we define a requester’s and worker’s utility, as well
as the platform’s profit in Definition 3, 4, and 5.
Definition 3 (Requester’s Utility). A requester rj’s utility is
defined as
urj =
{
vj − p
r
j , if rj ∈ SR
0, otherwise
. (2)
Definition 4 (Worker’s Utility). A worker wi’s utility is defined
as
uwi =
{
pwi − ci, if wi ∈ SW
0, otherwise
. (3)
Definition 5 (Platform’s Profit). The profit of the platform is
defined as
u0 =
∑
j:rj∈SR
prj −
∑
i:wi∈SW
pwi . (4)
Based on Definition 3, 4, and 5, we define the social welfare
of the MCS system in Definition 6.
Definition 6 (Social Welfare). The social welfare of the MCS
system is defined as
usocial = u0 +
∑
i:wi∈W
uwi +
∑
j:rj∈R
urj
=
∑
j:rj∈SR
vj −
∑
i:wi∈SW
ci. (5)
Clearly, the social welfare is the sum of the platform’s profit
and all requesters’ and workers’ utilities.
D. Design Objectives
In this paper, we aim to ensure that CENTURION bears the
following advantageous properties.
Since the requesters are strategic and selfish in our model, it
is possible that any requester rj submits a bid aj that deviates
from vj (i.e., her value for task τj). Similarly, any worker wi
might also submit a bid bi that differs from ci (i.e., her cost
for executing all tasks in Γi). Thus, one of our objectives is
to design a truthful incentive mechanism defined in Definition
7.
Definition 7 (Truthfulness). A MELON double auction is
truthful if and only if bidding vj and ci is the dominant strategy
for each requester rj and worker wi, i.e., bidding vj and ci
maximizes, respectively, the utility of each requester rj and
worker wi, regardless of other requesters’ and workers’ bids.
By definition 7, we aim to ensure that both requesters and
workers bid truthfully to the platform. Apart from truthfulness,
another desirable property that we aim to achieve is individual
rationality defined in Definition 8.
Definition 8 (Individual Rationality). A MELON double auc-
tion is individual rational if and only if no requesters or
workers receive negative utilities, i.e., we have urj ≥ 0, and
uwi ≥ 0, for every requester rj and worker wi, respectively.
Individual rationality is a crucial property to stimulate the
participation of both requesters and workers, because it ensures
that the charge to a requester is no larger than her value, and
a worker’s sensing cost is also totally compensated. As men-
tioned in Section III-A, CENTURION aggregates workers’
labels to ensure that the aggregated results have satisfactory
accuracy, which is mathematically defined in Definition 9.
Definition 9 (βj-Accuracy). A task τj is executed with βj-
accuracy if and only if Pr[L̂j 6= lj ] ≤ βj , where βj ∈ (0, 1),
and L̂j denotes the random variable representing the aggre-
gated result for task τj .
By Definition 9, βj-accuracy ensures that the aggregated
result equals to the true label with high probability. Note that,
for every task τj , βj is a parameter chosen by the platform, and
a smaller βj implies a stronger requirement for the accuracy.
In short, our objectives are to ensure that the proposed
CENTURION framework provides satisfactory accuracy guar-
antee for the aggregated results of all executed tasks, and
incentivizes the participation of both requesters and workers
in a truthful and individual rational manner.
IV. DESIGN DETAILS
In this section, we present the design details of the incentive
and data aggregation mechanism of CENTURION.
A. Data Aggregation Mechanism
1) Proposed Mechanism
Although the data aggregation mechanism follows the in-
centive mechanism in CENTURION’s workflow, we introduce
it first, as it affects the design of the incentive mechanism.
In order to capture the effect of workers’ diverse reliability
on the calculation of the aggregated results, CENTURION
adopts the following weighted aggregation method. That is,
the aggregated result l̂j for every executed task τj is calculated
as
l̂j = sign
( ∑
i:wi∈SW ,τj∈Γi
λi,j li,j
)
, (6)
where λi,j > 0 is worker wi’s weight on task τj . Furthermore,
the function sign(x) equals to +1, if x ≥ 0, and −1 otherwise.
Intuitively, higher weights should be assigned to workers
who are more likely to submit correct labels, which makes the
aggregated results closer to the labels provided by more reli-
able workers. In fact, many state-of-the-art literature [36, 37]
utilize such weighted aggregation method to aggregate work-
ers’ data. As the weight λi,j ’s highly affect the accuracy of the
aggregated results, we propose, in the following Algorithm 1,
the data aggregation mechanism of CENTURION.
Algorithm 1 takes as inputs the reliability level matrix θ,
the workers’ label matrix l, the profile of workers’ interested
task sets, denoted as Γ = (Γ1, · · · ,ΓN ), the winning requester
set SR, and the winning worker set SW . Note that a large θi,j
indicates that a worker wi has a high reliability level for task
τj , and any worker wi with θi,j ≤ 0.5 will not be selected as
Algorithm 1: Data Aggregation Mechanism
Input: θ, l, Γ, SR, SW ;
Output:
{
l̂j |rj ∈ SR
}
;
1 foreach j s.t. rj ∈ SR do
2 l̂j ←
∑
i:wi∈SW ,τj∈Γi
(
2θi,j − 1
)
li,j ;
3 return
{
l̂j |rj ∈ SR
}
;
a winner by the incentive mechanism. The aggregated result
l̂j for each winning requester rj’s task τj is calculated (line
1-2) using Equation (6) with the weight
λi,j = 2θi,j − 1, ∀rj ∈ SR, wi ∈ SW , τj ∈ Γi. (7)
By Equation (7), we have that λi,j , i.e., worker wi’s weight
for task τj , increases with θi,j , which conforms to our intuition
that the higher the probability that worker wi provides a correct
label about task τj , the more her label li,j should be counted
in the calculation of the aggregated result about this task.
We provide the formal analysis about the data aggregation
mechanism in Section IV-A2.
2) Analysis
In Theorem 1, we prove that the aggregated results calcu-
lated by Algorithm 1 has desirable accuracy guarantee.
Theorem 1. For each executed task τj , the data aggregation
mechanism given in Algorithm 1 minimizes the upper bound of
the error probability of the aggregated result, i.e., Pr[L̂j 6= lj ]
(where L̂j is the random variable representing the aggregated
result for task τj mentioned in Definition 9), and satisfies that
Pr[L̂j 6= lj ] ≤ exp
(
−
∑
i:wi∈SW ,τj∈Γi
(2θi,j − 1)2
2
)
. (8)
Proof. We denote Xi,j as the random variable for worker wi’s
weighted label about task τj , i.e., Xi,j = λi,j lj with proba-
bility θi,j , and Xi,j = −λi,j lj with probability 1− θi,j . Then,
we define Xj =
∑
i:wi∈SW ,τj∈Γi
Xi,j , and thus, E[Xj ] =∑
i:wi∈SW ,τj∈Γi
E[Xi,j ] =
∑
i:wi∈SW ,τj∈Γi
ljλi,j(2θi,j − 1).
The error probability of the aggregated result can be calcu-
lated as Pr[L̂j 6= lj ] = Pr[Xj < 0|lj = 1]Pr[lj = 1]+Pr[Xj ≥
0|lj = −1]Pr[lj = −1], and based on the Chernoff-Hoeffding
bound, we have
Pr[Xj < 0|lj = 1] = Pr[E[Xj ]−Xj > E[Xj ]|lj = 1]
≤ exp
(
−
2(E[Xj |lj = 1])
2∑
i:wi∈SW ,τj∈Γi
(2λi,j)2
)
= exp
(
−
(∑
i:wi∈SW ,τj∈Γi
λi,j(2θi,j − 1)
)
2
2
∑
i:wi∈SW ,τj∈Γi
λ2
i,j
)
.
Then, we define the vector λj = [λi,j ] for every executed
task τj , which contains every λi,j such that wi ∈ SW , and
τj ∈ Γi. Therefore, minimizing the upper bound of Pr[Xj <
0|lj = 1] is equivalent to finding the vector λj that maximizes
the function f(λj) defined as
f(λj) =
(∑
i:wi∈SW ,τj∈Γi
λi,j(2θi,j − 1)
)2∑
i:wi∈SW ,τj∈Γi
λ2i,j
.
Based on the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we have
f(λj) ≤
(∑
i:wi∈SW ,τj∈Γi
λ2i,j
)(∑
i:wi∈SW ,τj∈Γi
(2θi,j − 1)
2
)
∑
i:wi∈SW ,τj∈Γi
λ2i,j
=
∑
i:wi∈SW ,τj∈Γi
(2θi,j − 1)
2
,
and equality is achieved if and only if λi,j ∝ 2θi,j − 1. Thus,
Pr[Xj < 0|lj = 1] ≤ exp
(
−
∑
i:wi∈SW ,τj∈Γi
(2θi,j − 1)
2
2
)
. (9)
Similarly, from the Chernoff-Hoeffding bound, we have
Pr[Xj ≥ 0|lj = −1] ≤ exp
(
−
(∑
i:wi∈SW ,τj∈Γi
λi,j(2θi,j − 1)
)
2
2
∑
i:wi∈SW ,τj∈Γi
λ2i,j
)
.
The upper bound of Pr[Xj > 0|lj = −1] is also minimized
if and only if λi,j ∝ 2θi,j − 1 based on the Cauchy-Schwarz
inequality, and we have
Pr[Xj ≥ 0|lj = −1] ≤ exp
(
−
∑
i:wi∈SW ,τj∈Γi
(2θi,j − 1)
2
2
)
. (10)
From Inequality (9) and (10), we have that when λi,j =
2θi,j − 1, the upper bound of Pr[L̂j 6= lj ] is minimized, and
Pr[L̂j 6= lj ] ≤ exp
(
−
∑
i:wi∈SW ,τj∈Γi
(2θi,j − 1)
2
2
)
,
which exactly proves Theorem 1.
By Theorem 1, we have that the data aggregation mecha-
nism proposed in Algorithm 1 upper bounds the error proba-
bility Pr[L̂j 6= lj ] by exp
(
− 12
∑
i:wi∈SW ,τj∈Γi
(2θi,j − 1)2
)
,
which in fact is the minimum upper bound of this probability.
Next, we derive Corollary 1, which is directly utilized in our
design of the incentive mechanism in Section IV-B.
Corollary 1. For every executed task τj , the data aggregation
mechanism proposed in Algorithm 1 satisfies that if∑
i:wi∈SW ,τj∈Γi
(2θi,j − 1)
2 ≥ 2 ln
(
1
βj
)
, (11)
then Pr[L̂j 6= lj ] ≤ βj , i.e., βj-accuracy is satisfied for this
task τj , where βj ∈ (0, 1) is a platform chosen parameter.
Moreover, we define β as the vector (β1, · · · , βM ).
Proof. By setting the upper bound of Pr[L̂j 6= lj] given in
Theorem 1 to be no greater than βj ∈ (0, 1), we have
exp
(
−
∑
i:wi∈SW ,τj∈Γi
(2θi,j − 1)2
2
)
≤ βj ,
which is equivalent to∑
i:wi∈SW ,τj∈Γi
(2θi,j − 1)
2 ≥ 2 ln
(
1
βj
)
. (12)
Hence, together with Theorem 1, we have that Inequality (12)
indicates that Pr[L̂j 6= lj ] ≤ βj .
Corollary 1 gives us a sufficient condition, represented by
Inequality (11), that the set of winning workers SW selected
by the incentive mechanism (proposed in Section IV-B) should
satisfy so as to achieve βj-accuracy for each executed task τj .
B. Incentive Mechanism
Now, we introduce the design details of CENTURION’s
incentive mechanism, including its mathematical formulation,
the hardness proof of the formulated integer program, the
proposed mechanism, as well as the corresponding analysis.
1) Mathematical Formulation
As mentioned in Section III-C, CENTURION’s incentive
mechanism is based on the MELON double auction defined
in Definition 2. In this paper, we aim to design a MELON
double auction that maximizes the social welfare, while
guaranteeing satisfactory data aggregation accuracy. The
formal mathematical formulation of its winner selection
problem is provided in the following MELON double auction
social welfare maximization (MELON-SWM) problem.
MELON-SWM Problem:
max
∑
j:τj∈T
ajyj −
∑
i:wi∈W
bixi (13)
s.t.
∑
i:wi∈W,τj∈Γi
(2θi,j − 1)
2
xi ≥ 2 ln
(
1
βj
)
yj , ∀τj ∈ T (14)
xi, yj ∈ {0, 1}, ∀wi ∈ W, τj ∈ T (15)
Constants. The MELON-SWM problem takes as inputs the
task set T , the worker set W , the requesters’ and workers’ bid
profile a and b, the profile of workers’ interested task sets Γ,
the workers’ reliability level matrix θ, and the β vector.
Variables. On one hand, the MELON-SWM problem has a
vector of M binary variables, denoted as y = (y1, · · · , yM ).
Any yj = 1 indicates that task τj will be executed, and thus,
requester rj is a winning requester (i.e., rj ∈ SR), whereas
yj = 0 means rj 6∈ SR. On the other hand, the problem
has another vector of N binary variables, denoted as x =
(x1, · · · , xN ), where xi = 1 indicates that worker wi is a
winning worker (i.e., wi ∈ SW ), and xi = 0 means wi 6∈ SW .
Objective function. The objective function satisfies that∑
j:τj∈T
ajyj−
∑
i:wi∈W
bixi =
∑
j:rj∈SR
aj−
∑
i:wi∈SW
bi,
which is exactly the social welfare defined in Definition 6
based on the requesters’ and workers’ bids.
Constraints. For each task τj , Constraint (14) naturally
holds, if yj = 0. When yj = 1, it is equivalent to Inequality
(11) given in Corollary 1, which specifies the condition that
the set of selected winning workers SW should satisfy in
order to guarantee βj-accuracy for task τj . To simplify the
presentation, we introduce the following notations, namely
qi,j = (2θi,j − 1)2, q = [qi,j ] ∈ [0, 1]N×M , Qj = 2 ln
(
1
βj
)
,
and Q = [Qj ] ∈ [0,+∞)M×1. Thus, Constraint (14) can be
simplified as ∑
i:wi∈W,τj∈Γi
qi,jxi ≥ Qjyj , ∀τj ∈ T . (16)
Besides, we say a task τj is covered by a solution, if yj = 1.
2) Hardness Proof
We prove the NP-hardness of the MELON-SWM problem
by performing a polynomial-time reduction from the 3SAT(5)
problem which is formally defined in Definition 10.
Definition 10 (3SAT(5) Problem). In a 3SAT(5) problem, we
are given a set O = {z1, · · · , zn} of n Boolean variables, and
a collection C1, · · · , Cm of m clauses. Each clause is an OR
of exactly three literals, and every literal is either a variable
of O or its negation. Moreover, every variable participates in
exactly 5 clauses. Therefore, m = 5n3 . Given some constant
0 < ǫ < 1, a 3SAT(5) instance ϕ is a Yes-Instance if
there is an assignment to the variables of O satisfying all
clauses, whereas it is a No-Instance (with respect to ǫ), if
every assignment to the variables satisfies at most (1 − ǫ)m
clauses. An algorithm A distinguishes between the Yes- and
No-instances of the problem, if, given a Yes-Instance, it returns
a “YES” answer, and given a No-Instance it returns a “NO”
answer.
Regarding the hardness of the 3SAT(5) problem, we intro-
duce without proof the following well-known Lemma 1, which
is a consequence of the PCP theorem [38].
Lemma 1. There is some constant 0 < ǫ < 1, such
that distinguishing between the Yes- and No-instances of the
3SAT(5) problem, defined with respect to ǫ, is NP-complete.
Next, we introduce Theorem 2 and 3 that will be utilized
to prove the NP-hardness of the MELON-SWM problem.
Theorem 2. Any 3SAT(5) instance is polynomial-time re-
ducible to an instance of the MELON-SWM problem.
Proof. The reduction goes as follows. Assume there is a
3SAT(5) instance ϕ on n variables and m clauses. We define
3 parameters: X = ǫm100 (0 < ǫ < 1), Y = mnX , and
Z = mnY . The exact values of Y and Z are not important. We
just need to ensure Z ≫ Y ≫ X . We construct an instance of
the MELON-SWM problem corresponding to ϕ, by defining
the task set T , and the profile of workers’ interested task sets
Γ.
Out of the 8 possible assignments to the variables of some
clause Ck ∈ ϕ, exactly one does not satisfy Ck . Let Ak be
the set of the remaining 7 assignments. We define a set of
tasks Γ(Ck, α) for each clause Ck and assignment α ∈ Ak,
let Γ = [Γ(Ck, α)] for each clause Ck ∈ ϕ and assignment
α ∈ Ak, set the qi,j value of each worker wi and task τj ∈ Γi
as qi,j = 1, and set her bid as bi = 3+Y +Z . We also create
a dummy worker w0, with q0 = 1, b0 = 0, and Γ0 being
her interested task set. We start with all set Γ(Ck, α)’s being
empty, gradually define the tasks, and specify which sets they
belong to. The task set T consists of 4 subsets.
• The 1st subset E1 contains a task τ(zl, γ) for each vari-
able zl ∈ O and assignment γ ∈ {T, F} to this vari-
able. τ(zl, γ) belongs to each set Γ(Ck, α), such that zl
participates in Ck , and the assignment α to the vari-
ables of Ck gives assignment γ to zl. The Qj value
of the task τj corresponding to τ(zl, γ) is set as 5 −
the number of the clauses containing zl, and the value vj of
this task is set as 5.
• The 2nd subset E2 contains m tasks τ1, · · · , τm. Each τk ∈
E2 belongs to all sets corresponding to Ck and Ck+1, i.e., τk
belongs to all sets {Γ(Ck, α)|α ∈ Ak}∪{Γ(Ck+1, α′)|α′ ∈
Ak+1} with the subscripts being modulo m. The Qk value
of each such τk is set as 2, and its value vk is set as Y .
• The 3rd subset E3 contains a task τ(Ck) for each clause
Ck , and τ(Ck) belongs to set Γ(Ck, α) for each α ∈ Ak.
The Qj value of the task τj corresponding to τ(Ck) is set
as 1, and its value vj is set as Z .
• The 4th subset E4 contains a single task τ∗, whose Qj value
is set as 1 and value vj is set as X . The task τ∗ only belongs
to set Γ0.
This finishes the description of the reduction. Clearly, given
a 3SAT(5) instance ϕ, we can construct an instance of the
MELON-SWM problem in time polynomial in n.
We now analyze the optimal social welfare for an instance
of the MELON-SWM problem that corresponds to a 3SAT(5)
instance ϕ, when ϕ is a Yes- or No-Instance. Note that the
following analysis uses the same reduction as in Theorem 2.
Theorem 3. If the 3SAT(5) instance ϕ is a Yes-Instance, then
there is a solution to the resulting instance of the MELON-
SWM problem whose social welfare is X . If ϕ is a No-
Instance, then any solution has social welfare at most 0.
Proof. Let ϕ be a Yes-Instance, and A be an assignment to the
variables satisfying all clauses. We construct a solution S ′ to
the MELON-SWM problem. Firstly, we add Γ0 to S ′. Next,
for each clause Ck, we add to S ′ the unique set Γ(Ck, α),
where α is the assignment consistent with A. Then |S ′| = m,
and the total cost of all sets is (Y +Z+3)m. We now analyze
the number of tasks covered by S ′, and their values. Clearly,
τ∗ is covered by S ′, and it contributes X to the solution value.
• For each clause Ck ∈ ϕ, the unique task τ(Ck) ∈ E3 is
covered. Thus, all tasks in E3 are covered, and overall they
contribute value mZ to the solution.
• Consider some τk ∈ E2. S ′ contains one set corresponding
to Ck and Ck+1, respectively. Since τk belongs to both these
sets, and its Qk is 2, it is covered. Thus, all tasks in E2 are
covered, and they contribute value mY to the solution.
• Consider some variable zk ∈ O, and let γk ∈ {T, F} be the
assignment to zk under A. If Ck is any clause containing zk,
and Γ(Ck, α) is the set that belongs to S ′, then α gives the
assignment γk to zk. Thus, for all five clauses containing
zk, the corresponding sets chosen to S ′ contain τ(zk, γk),
and this task is covered. So the total number of tasks of E1
covered by S ′ is n. Each such task contributes value 5, and
the total value contributed by the tasks in E1 is 5n = 3m.
Therefore, the overall social welfare of this solution is X+
mZ +mY + 3m− (Z + Y + 3)m = X .
Assume now that ϕ is a No-Instance, and let S ′ be any
solution with positive social welfare. We can assume that
Γ0 ∈ S ′, and task τ∗ is covered by S ′. We then introduce
the following observations, whose proofs are provided in the
appendices.
Observation 1. For every clause Ck of ϕ, at most one of the
sets {Γ(Ck, α)|α ∈ Ak} belongs to S ′, and |S ′| = m.
Observation 2. For every variable zk ∈ O, at most one of
the two tasks τ(zk, T ) and τ(zk, F ) is covered by S ′.
We say that a variable zk ∈ O is bad if neither τ(zk, T )
nor τ(zk, F ) is covered by S ′; otherwise it is good. We next
show that only a small number of the variables are bad.
Observation 3. There are at most ǫn100 bad variables.
Then, we construct the following assignment to the variables
of O. If variable zk ∈ O is good, then there is a unique value
γk ∈ {T, F}, such that task τ(zk, γk) is covered by S ′. We
then assign zk the value γk. If zk is bad, we assign it any value
arbitrarily. We now claim that the above assignment satisfies
more than (1− ǫ)m clauses. We say that a clause is bad if it
contains a bad variable, and it is good otherwise. Since there
are at most ǫn100 bad variables, and each variable participates
in 5 clauses, the number of bad clauses is at most ǫn20 ≤
3ǫm
100 .
So there are more than (1 − ǫ)m good clauses. Let Cl be a
good clause, and Γ(Cl, α) be the set corresponding to Cl that
belongs to S ′. Then α is an assignment to the variables of
Cl that satisfies Cl, and each variable participating in Cl was
assigned a value consistent with α. So clause Cl is satisfied.
To conclude, we have assumed that ϕ is a No-Instance,
and showed that, if the MELON-SWM problem has a solution
with non-negative social welfare, there is an assignment to the
variables of ϕ satisfying more than (1 − ǫ)m of its clauses,
which is impossible for a No-Instance. Therefore, if ϕ is a
No-Instance, every solution has social welfare at most 0.
Next, we describe Theorem 4 that states the NP-hardness
and inapproximability of the MELON-SWM problem.
Theorem 4. The MELON-SWM problem is NP-hard, and for
any factor φ, there is no efficient φ-approximation algorithm
to the MELON-SWM problem.
Proof. Based on Theorem 2, there exists a reduction from
any 3SAT(5) problem instance ϕ to an instance I(ϕ) of the
MELON-SWM problem. From Theorem 3, we have that the
optimal solution to I(ϕ) also gives a solution to ϕ. That is, if
the optimal social welfare of I(ϕ) is positive, then ϕ is a Yes-
Instance; otherwise, ϕ is a No-Instance. Together with Lemma
1 stating the NP-completeness of the 3SAT(5) problem, we
conclude that the MELON-SWM problem is NP-hard.
In fact, Theorem 2 and 3 give an inapproximability result
about the MELON-SWM, as well. Suppose there is an efficient
factor-φ approximation algorithm A for the MELON-SWM
problem. We can use it to distinguish Yes- and No-instances
of the 3SAT(5) problem on n ≫ φ variables. If ϕ is a Yes-
Instance, then the algorithm has to return a solution with
positive social welfare for I(ϕ), and if ϕ is a No-Instance,
then any solution has social welfare at most 0. So algorithm
A distinguishes the Yes- and the No-instances of 3SAT(5),
contradicting Lemma 1.
3) Proposed Mechanism
Theorem 4 not only shows the NP-hardness of the MELON-
SWM problem, but also indicates that there is no efficient
algorithm with a guaranteed approximation ratio for it. There-
fore, we relax the requirement of provable approximation
ratio, and propose the following MELON double auction that
aims to ensure non-negative social welfare, instead. Its winner
selection algorithm is given in the following Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: MELON Double Auction Winner Selection
Input: T , R, W , Γ, a, b, q, Q;
Output: SR, SW , C;
// Initialization
1 SR ← ∅, SW ← ∅;
// Find a feasible cover
2 C ← FC(T ,Γ,q,Q);
3 foreach j s.t. τj ∈ T do
4 Cj ← {wi|wi ∈ C, τj ∈ Γi};
// Main loop
5 while maxj:rj∈R
(
aj −
∑
i:wi∈Cj
bi
)
≥ 0 do
6 j∗ ← argmaxj:rj∈R
(
aj −
∑
i:wi∈Cj
bi
)
;
7 SR ← SR ∪ {rj∗};
8 R← R \ {rj∗};
9 SW ← SW ∪ Cj∗ ;
10 foreach j s.t. ri ∈ R do
11 Cj ← Cj \ Cj∗ ;
12 return SR,SW ;
Algorithm 2 takes as inputs the task set T , the requester
set R, the worker set W , the profile of workers’ interested
task sets Γ, the requesters’ and workers’ bid profile a and b,
the q matrix, as well as the Q vector. Firstly, it initializes
the winning requester and worker set as ∅ (line 1). Then, it
calculates a feasible cover, denoted by C, containing the set
of workers that make Constraint (16) feasible for each task
τj given that each yj = 1, by calling another algorithm FC
which takes the task set T , the profile of workers’ interested
task sets Γ, the q matrix, and the Q vector as inputs (line 2).
Algorithm FC can be easily implemented in time polynomial
in M and N . For example, FC could greedily select each
worker wi into the feasible cover in a decreasing order of
the value
∑
j:τj∈Γi
qi,j until all constraints are satisfied. The
computational complexity of such FC is O(N). We assume
that FC adopts such a greedy approach in the rest of this paper.
Note that the specific choice of FC is not important, as long as
it returns a feasible cover in polynomial time. Next, for each
task τj , Algorithm 2 chooses from the feasible cover the set
of workers Cj whose interested task sets contain this task (line
3-4).
Based on C, the main loop (line 5-11) of the algorithm
selects the set of winning requesters and workers that give
non-negative social welfare. It executes until maxj:rj∈R
(
aj−∑
i:wi∈Cj
bi
)
, the maximum marginal social welfare of in-
cluding a new requester rj and the set of workers Cj into,
respectively, the winning requester and worker set, becomes
negative (line 5). In each iteration of the main loop, the
Algorithm finds first the index j∗ of the requester rj∗ that
provides the maximum marginal social welfare (line 6). Next,
it includes rj∗ into the winning requester set SR (line 7),
removes rj∗ from the requester set R (line 8), and includes
all workers in Cj∗ into the winning worker set SW (line 9).
The last step of the main loop is to remove all workers in Cj∗
from Cj for each task τj (line 10). Finally, Algorithm 2 returns
the winning requester and worker set SR and SW (line 12).
Next, we present the pricing algorithm of the MELON
double auction in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3: MELON Double Auction Pricing
Input: T , R, W , Γ, a, b, q, Q, SR, SW ;
Output: pr, pw;
// Initialization
1 pr ← 0, pw ← 0;
// Pricing for winning requesters
2 foreach j s.t. rj ∈ SR do
3 run Algorithm 2 on R \ {rj} and W;
4 S ′R ←winning requester set when line 3 stops;
5 foreach k s.t. rk ∈ S ′R do
6 prj ← min
{
prj ,
∑
wi∈C
′
j
bi + ak −
∑
wi∈C
′
k
bi
}
;
7 if C′j = ∅ then
8 prj ← min{prj , 0};
// Pricing for winning workers
9 foreach i s.t. wi ∈ SW do
10 run Algorithm 2 on R and W \ {wi};
11 S ′R ←winning requester set when line 10 stops;
12 foreach k s.t. wi ∈ C′k and rk ∈ S ′R do
13 sort requesters according to the decreasing order of
aj −
∑
i:wi∈C
′
j
bi;
14 f ←index of the first requester with wi 6∈ C′f ;
15 if rf ∈ S ′R then
16 pwi ←
max
{
pwi , ak−
∑
wh∈C
′
k
bh−
(
af−
∑
wh∈C
′
f
bh
)}
;
17 else
18 pwi ← max
{
pwi , ak −
∑
wh∈C
′
k
bh
}
;
19 return pr , pw;
Apart from the same inputs to Algorithm 2, Algorithm 3
also takes as inputs the winning requester and worker set
SR and SW , outputted by Algorithm 2. Firstly, Algorithm 3
initializes the requesters’ and workers’ payment profile as zero
vectors (line 1). Then, it calculates the payment prj charged
from each winning requester (line 2-8). For each rj ∈ SR,
Algorithm 2 is executed on the worker set W and requester set
R except requester rj (line 3). Next, it sets S ′R as the winning
requester set when line 3 stops (line 4). For each rk ∈ S ′R,
Algorithm 3 finds the minimum bid aj,k for requester rj to
replace rk as the winner. To achieve this, aj,k should satisfy
aj,k −
∑
wi∈C′j
bi = ak −
∑
wi∈C′k
bi, which is equivalent to
aj,k =
∑
wi∈C′j
bi + ak −
∑
wi∈C′k
bi. Note that C′1, · · · , C′M
denote the sets C1, · · · , CM when the specific requester rk is
selected into S ′R. If C′j is not empty, the minimum value among
these aj,k’s is chosen as the payment prj (line 5-6); otherwise,
it is further compared with 0 (line 7-8), since requester rj
could win, in this case, as long as her bid is non-negative.
Next, Algorithm 3 derives the payment pwi to each winning
worker wi (line 9-18). Similar to line 3, Algorithm 2 is
executed on the requester set R and worker set W except
worker wi (line 10), and S ′R is set as the winning requester
set when line 10 stops (line 11). In the rest of the algorithm,
we also use C′1, · · · , C′M to denote the sets C1, · · · , CM when
the specific requester rk is selected into S ′R. For each set
C′k such that wi belongs to C′k and rk belongs to S ′R, the
algorithm calculates the maximum bid bi,k for worker wi
to be selected as a winner at this point (line 12-18). The
calculation firstly sorts requesters in the decreasing order
of their marginal social welfare, i.e., aj −
∑
i:wi∈C′j
bi (line
13), and finds the index f of the first the requester in
this order such that wi does not belong to C′f (line 14). If
rf is a winning requester in S ′R, then bi,k should satisfy
ak −
(∑
wh∈C′k
bh + bi,k
)
= af −
∑
wh∈C′f
bh, which is
equivalent to bi,k = ak −
∑
wh∈C′k
bh −
(
af −
∑
wh∈C′f
bh
)
;
otherwise, bi,k should satisfy ak −
(∑
wh∈C′k
bh + bi,k
)
= 0,
which is equivalent to bi,k = ak −
∑
wh∈C′k
bh. Then, the
maximum value among these bi,k’s are chosen as the payment
pwi (line 15-18). Finally, Algorithm 3 returns the requesters’
and workers’ payment profile pr and pw (line 19).
4) Analysis of the Proposed Mechanism
In this section, we prove several desirable properties of
our MELON double auction, described in Algorithm 2 and
3. Firstly, we show its truthfulness in Theorem 5.
Theorem 5. The proposed MELON double auction is truthful.
Proof. We prove the truthfulness of the MELON double auc-
tion by showing that it satisfies the properties of monotonicity
and critical payment.
• Monotonicity. The algorithm FC called by Algorithm 2
is independent of the requesters’ and workers’ bids, and
winners are selected based on a decreasing order of the value
aj −
∑
i:wi∈Cj
bi. Thus, if a requester rj wins by bidding
aj , she will also win the auction by bidding any a′j > aj .
Similarly, if a worker wi wins by bidding bi, she will win
the auction, as well, if her bid takes any value b′i < bi.
• Critical payment. Algorithm 3 in fact pays every winning
requester and worker the infimum and supremum of her bid,
respectively, that can make her a winner.
As proved in [39], these two properties make an auction
truthful, i.e., each requester rj maximizes her utility by bid-
ding vj , and each worker wi maximizes her utility by bidding
ci. Therefore, the MELON double auction is truthful.
Next, we show that the proposed MELON double auction
satisfies individual rationality in Theorem 6.
Theorem 6. The proposed MELON double auction is individ-
ual rational.
Proof. By Definition 3 and 4, losers of the MELON double
auction receive zero utilities. From Theorem 5, every winning
requester rj bids vj , and every winning worker wi bids ci
to the platform. Moreover, they are paid, respectively, the
infimum and supremum of the bid for them to win the auction.
Therefore, it is guaranteed that all requesters and workers
receive non-negative utilities, and thus the proposed MELON
double auction is individual rational.
In Theorem 7, we prove that the proposed MELON double
auction has a polynomial-time computational complexity.
Theorem 7. The computational complexity of the proposed
MELON double auction is O(M3N +M2N2).
Proof. As mentioned in Section IV-A1, the algorithm FC (line
2) in Algorithm 2 takes a greedy approach, and has a com-
putational complexity of O(N). Line 3-4 of Algorithm 2 that
find the sets C1, · · · , CM terminate at most after MN steps.
Next, the main loop (line 5-11) terminates after M iterations
in worst case. Within each iteration, finding the index of the
requester that provides the maximum marginal social welfare
(line 6) takes O(M) time, and updating the sets C1, · · · , CM
takes O(MN) time. Therefore, the computational complexity
of the main loop is O(MN), and thus, that of Algorithm 2
is O(M2N) overall. After Algorithm 2, our MELON double
auction executes its pricing algorithm described by Algorithm
3, where the loop for requester pricing (line 1-8) terminates
in worst case after M iterations. Clearly, the computational
complexity of each iteration of the loop is dominated by the
execution of Algorithm 2 in line 3. Therefore, the requester
pricing (line 1-8) in Algorithm 3 takes O(M3N) time. Fol-
lowing a similar method of analysis, we can conclude that the
worker pricing in Algorithm 3 takes O(M2N2) time. Hence,
the computation complexity of Algorithm 3, as well as that of
the overall MELON double auction is O(M3N+M2N2).
Finally, we show in Theorem 8 that our MELON double
auction guarantees non-negative social welfare, as required.
Theorem 8. The MELON double auction guarantees non-
negative social welfare.
Proof. Clearly, in the winner selection algorithm described by
Algorithm 2, a requester rj and the workers in Cj could be
selected as winners, only if the corresponding marginal social
welfare aj −
∑
i:wi∈Cj
bi is non-negative (line 5). Thus, as
the overall social welfare given by Algorithm 2 is the sum of
the aforementioned marginal social welfare of every iteration
where new winners are selected, the MELON double auction
guarantees non-negative social welfare.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we introduce the baseline methods, simula-
tions settings, as well as simulation results of the performance
evaluation about our proposed CENTURION framework.
A. Baseline Methods
In our evaluation of the incentive mechanism, the first
baseline auction is the Marginal Social Welfare greedy (MSW-
Greedy) double auction. As in Algorithm 2, it also initializes
the winner sets as ∅, executes the algorithm FC to obtain a
feasible cover C, and chooses from C the set Cj containing
each worker wi such that τj ∈ Γi for each task τj . Different
from the MELON double auction, it sorts requesters in a
decreasing order of their marginal social welfare, i.e., the
value aj −
∑
i:wi∈Cj
bi for each requester rj . Then, it selects
the requester rj and the set of workers in Cj as winners
until the marginal social welfare becomes negative. Its pricing
algorithm is the same as that of the MELON double auction.
Clearly, the MSW-Greedy double auction is truthful and
individual rational. Another baseline auction is the one that
initiAlizes the feasIble cover C as the entire woRker set W ,
which we call AIR double auction. The rest of its winner
selection, as well as the entire pricing algorithm is the same
as those of our MELON double auction. It is easily provable
that the AIR double auction is also truthful and individual
rational.
Furthermore, we compare our weighted data aggregation
mechanism with a mean aggregation mechanism, which out-
puts +1 as the aggregated result for a task if the mean of
workers’ labels about this task is non-negative, and outputs
−1, otherwise. Another baseline aggregation mechanism that
we consider is the median aggregation that takes the median
of workers’ labels about a task as its aggregated result.
B. Simulation Settings
Setting vj ci θi,j βj |Γ∗i | N M
I [10, 20] [5, 15] [0, 1] [0.05, 0.1] [15, 20] [90, 150] 60
II [10, 20] [5, 15] [0, 1] [0.05, 0.1] [15, 20] 60 [20, 80]
TABLE I
SIMULATION SETTINGS
The parameter settings in our simulation are given in Table
I. Specifically, parameters vj , ci, θi,j , βj , and |Γ∗i | are sampled
uniformly at random from the intervals given in Table I. The
worker wi’s true interested task set Γ∗i contains |Γ∗i | tasks that
are randomly selected from the task set T . In setting I, we fix
the number of requesters as 60 and vary the number of workers
from 90 to 150, whereas we fix the number of workers as 60
and vary the number of requesters from 20 to 80 in setting II.
C. Simulation Results
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Fig. 2. Social welfare (setting I)
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Fig. 3. Social welfare (setting II)
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Fig. 4. MAE (setting I)
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Fig. 5. MAE (setting II)
In Figure 2 and 3, we compare the social welfare generated
by our MELON double auction with those of the two baseline
auctions. These two figures show that our MELON double
auction generates social welfare far more than the MSW-
Greedy and AIR double auction under both setting I and II.
We evaluate CENTURION’s accuracy guarantee in setting
I and II with a minor change of the parameter βj , i.e., βj
for each task τj is fixed as 0.05 to simplify presentation. We
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Fig. 6. Error probability (setting I)
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Fig. 7. Error probability (setting II)
compare the mean absolute error (MAE) for all tasks, which
is defined as MAE = 1
M
∑
j:τj∈T
|lˆj − lj |, of our weighted
aggregation mechanism proposed in Algorithm 1 with those
of the mean d median aggregation. The simulation for each
combination of worker and requester number is repeated for
50000 times, and we plot the means and standard deviations
of the MAEs in Figure 4 and 5. From these two figures, we
observe that the MAE of our weighted aggregation mechanism
is far less than those of the mean and median aggregation.
Then, we show our simulation results about Pr[|lˆj − lj|],
referred to as task τj’s error probability (EP). After 50000
repetitions of the simulation for any given combination of
worker and requester number, empirical values of the EPs
are calculated, and the means and standard deviations of the
empirical EPs are plotted in Figure 6 and 7. These two figures
show that the empirical EPs are less than the required upper
bound βj and far less than those of the mean and median
aggregation.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose CENTURION, a novel integrated
framework for multi-requester MCS systems, consisting of
a double auction-based incentive mechanism that stimulates
the participation of both requesters and workers, and a data
aggregation mechanism that aggregates workers data. Its in-
centive mechanism bears many desirable properties including
truthfulness, individual rationality, computational efficiency, as
well as non-negative social welfare, and its data aggregation
mechanism generates highly accurate aggregated results.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF OBSERVATION 1
Proof. Let R be the set of all clauses Ck, such that S ′ contains
any set of the form Γ(Ck, α), and assume that |R| = t. Then
the number of tasks of E3 covered by S ′ is exactly t, and they
contribute value tZ to the social welfare. All remaining tasks
may contribute at most Z2 value to the social welfare. Since
the cost of every set in S ′ is at least Z , in order for the final
social welfare to be non-negative, |S ′| = t must hold, and so
S ′ contains at most one set corresponding to every clause.
Next, we prove that |S ′| = m. Let t be the number of tasks
of E1 covered by the solution. From previous discussions,
|S ′| = t. Assume for contradiction that |S ′| < m. Then the
number of task of E2 covered by S ′ is at most t−1. Therefore,
the total value of all tasks covered by the solution is upper
bounded by X+tZ+(t−1)Y +10n = X+tZ+tY +6m−Y ,
while the total cost of all sets in S ′ is (Z+Y +3)t. Therefore,
the total profit is at most X + 6m− Y − 3t < 0.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF OBSERVATION 2
Proof. Assume for contradiction that for some zk ∈ O, both
τ(zk, T ) and τ(zk, F ) are covered by S ′. Recall that there are
exactly five clauses containing the variable zk. Both tasks only
belong to sets corresponding to these five clauses, and each
such set contains exactly one of the two tasks. Since the Qj
value of each such task is 5, and for each clause Ck exactly
one of its corresponding set belongs to S ′, it is impossible that
both τ(zk, T ) and τ(zk, F ) are covered by S ′.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF OBSERVATION 3
Proof. Assume otherwise. Then S ′ covers at most (1− ǫ100 )n
tasks of E1, each of which contributes 5 to the solution value,
so the tasks of E1 contribute at most 5n(1 − ǫ100 ) = 3m −
ǫn
20 value overall. From the above discussion, the tasks of E2
contribute Y m, those of E3 contribute Zm, and the single
task of E4 contributes X . The total value of all tasks covered
is then at most X + 3m − ǫn20 + Zm + Y m, while the total
cost of all sets is m(Z+Y +3). Therefore, the social welfare
is X − ǫn20 < 0, a contradiction.
